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Recent macroeconomic experience has drawn attention to the importance of interdependence among
countries through financial markets and institutions, independently of traditional trade linkages. This
paper develops a model of the international transmission of shocks due to interdependent portfolio
holdings among leverage-constrained investors. In our model, without leverage constraints on investment,
financial integration itself has no implication for international macro co-movements. When leverage
constraints bind however, the presence of these constraints in combination with diversified portfolios
introduces a powerful financial transmission channel which results in a positive co-movement of production,
independently of the size of international trade linkages. In addition, the paper shows that, with binding
leverage constraints, the type of financial integration is critical for international co-movement. If international
financial markets allow for trade only in non-contingent bonds, but not equities, then the international
co-movement of shocks is negative. Thus, with leverage constraints, moving from bond trade to equity
trade reverses the sign of the international transmission ofVKocks.
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The recent international financial crisis has highlighted the critical role of financial 
markets in the propagation of business cycle shocks, both in transmitting shocks from one 
country to another and in magnifying the effects of those shocks. One key aspect of this 
transmission mechanism, seen in both the recent crisis as well as the Asian and Russian crises a 
decade ago, is the importance of balance sheet linkages among investors and financial 
institutions across countries. This implies that asset price collapses in one country are transmitted 
internationally through deteriorations in the balance sheets of institutions in countries holding 
portfolios of similar assets.  
It is widely agreed that high financial leverage – a high ratio of assets to underlying 
capital – is a critical factor in the magnifying effects of financial crises. As asset values decline, 
highly levered financial institutions find their net worth sharply eroded and are forced to shed 
assets to avoid unacceptable risks of insolvency. But asset sales drive asset values down further, 
adversely impairing the balance sheets of other institutions. These institutions in turn are forced 
to sell assets, creating a vicious cycle of balance sheet deterioration and asset sales. While the 
financial dynamics of such balance sheet adjustments have been widely discussed elsewhere, it is 
less well understood how this process affects macroeconomic outcomes, or that this process 
alone may generate an immediate and powerful international transmission of shocks.  
A clear pre-requisite for balance sheet adjustments to have powerful macroeconomic 
effects is the presence of financial frictions of some sort, or distortions in credit markets. After 
all, in a Modigliani-Miller world, leverage is irrelevant. Thus, in order to capture the dynamics of 
the financial meltdown, financial frictions will be of critical importance.    3
In the context of the international transmission of business cycles, however, other puzzles 
arise. Most models of business cycle transmission still rely on international linkages due to trade 
flows. While global trade has been growing at remarkable rates over the past two decades, it is 
still the case that the major world regions – the United States, Asia and Europe – are to a large 
extent ‘closed’ economies, with the share of inter-regional trade representing only a small 
proportion of overall GDP. Thus Kose and Yi (2006) find that it is hard to account for the 
magnitude of business cycle co-movements among countries using conventional international 
real business cycle models. In addition there is evidence that business cycle co-movement is 
greater between countries with greater financial integration (Imbs 2004, 2006). Nevertheless, in 
the standard international business cycle model, enhanced international financial integration 
actually tends to reduce business cycle co-movement, since it allows for a more efficient 
reallocation of resources across countries in response to shocks (Heathcote and Perri 2002, 
2005). But Krugman (2008) suggests that traditional multi-country business cycle models lack a 
critical ‘international finance multiplier,’ by which financial shocks in one country affect 
investment both in the original country and in other countries, through financial or balance sheet 
linkages.  
This paper develops a theoretical model of a balance sheet channel for the international 
transmission of shocks. The model emphasizes how a process of balance sheet contractions, 
generated by a downturn in one country, is spread across countries through inter-connected 
portfolios. In the presence of leverage constraints, we show that this gives rise to a separate 
financial transmission mechanism of business cycle shocks that is independent of trade linkages.
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1 In the recent literature, for example Krugman (2008), the adjustment of balance sheets is sometimes referred to as 
‘de-leveraging.’ This term is inaccurate as a description of our model since, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the 
leverage ratio is constant. Nonetheless, the process of satisfying leverage constraints in the wake of asset price   4
The paper’s main contribution is to compare how macro shocks are transmitted under different 
financial market structures. We do not attempt to provide an integrated explanation of the recent 
crisis, or a full quantitative calibration, but instead highlight how the joint process of balance 
sheet constraints and portfolio interdependence generate an important cross-country propagation 
effect. We develop a two-country model in which investors borrow from savers, and invest in 
fixed assets. Investors also diversify their portfolios across countries and hold equity positions in 
the assets of the other country, as well as their own. Investors cannot commit to repay savers, 
however, and in order to ensure payment, may face limits on the maximum amount of leverage 
on their balance sheets.  
We analyze four different variants of the model. First we consider a version of the model 
in which bond markets are segmented across countries but equity markets are integrated, both 
with and without binding leverage constraints. In the case where leverage limits do not bind there 
is no international transmission of shocks in final goods production. A negative productivity 
shock, which leads to a fall in the value of assets in one country, will cause investors to sell some 
assets and reduce their debt exposure, but this does not affect other countries. In fact investors in 
other countries increase their borrowing. More broadly, business cycle fluctuations in final goods 
production across countries are uncorrelated in the absence of limits on leverage.  
When leverage constraints are binding, however, there is a powerful transmission of 
shocks across countries. A fall in asset values in one country forces a large and immediate 
process of balance sheet contractions for that country’s investors. But the fall in asset values 
leads to balance sheet deterioration in other countries that have internationally diversified asset 
portfolios, causing a sell-off in assets and a forced reduction in borrowing around the globe. 
                                                                                                                                                             
declines does impart a magnification effect on real activity. Endogenizing the maximum leverage ratio represents a 
separate issue, beyond the scope of this paper. For a recent contribution, see Geanakoplos (2009).   5
This, in turn, drives a further sell-off in the first country, establishing a feedback loop. The end 
result is a large magnification of the initial shock, a large fall in investment, and highly 
correlated business cycles across countries during the resulting downturn.  
We explore the relationship between financial integration and business cycle co-
movement further in a model with integrated bond markets. We assume that international bond 
markets are integrated across countries and leverage constraints always bind. We then contrast 
the properties of an economy without internationally diversified equity holdings with one with 
fully integrated equity markets. In the case where equity markets are segmented, we find that 
macroeconomic shocks are transmitted negatively across countries. A negative productivity 
shock in the home country pushes down investment there, but the resulting decline in world 
interest rates stimulates borrowing, investment and consumption in the foreign country. Hence 
borrowing, asset prices, output and consumption all move in opposite directions in the two 
countries.  
The final variant of the model we explore is one where both bond and equity markets are 
integrated. Here we find positive co-movement across countries that is similar to a world without 
integrated bond markets.  
The model has strong implications for understanding the effects of financial market 
integration. In the presence of leverage constraints and internationally diversified equity 
holdings, financial market integration (in equity markets) is associated with a ‘financial 
contagion’ effect, in the sense that asset price movements cause negative shocks to be 
propagated through balance sheets – propagation effects that would not occur in an international 
economy without international portfolio diversification.    6
The contrasting results between the final two variants of the model also suggests that it 
may be important to distinguish the ex-ante from the ex-post gains to international portfolio 
diversification. In the absence of equity market integration, the presence of negative co-
movement in returns suggests substantial gains from portfolio diversification. But, in a world 
with binding leverage constraints, the process of integrating equity markets leads to strong 
positive co-movement in production, reducing the ex-post gains from diversification.
2  
The model draws heavily on a number of separate literatures. First, and most importantly, 
we follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in imposing leverage constraints on investors. This leads 
to a wedge between the effective returns faced by investors and savers, and can act as an 
amplification mechanism for business cycle shocks.
3 Second, we emphasize the linkages among 
countries through the presence of inter-connected portfolios. Portfolio linkages, in a somewhat 
different context, have for some time been seen as important in the contagion effects of financial 
shocks (see Rigobon 2003 and Pavlova and Rigobon 2008, for example). Finally, we introduce 
endogenous portfolio interdependence through the recently developed techniques of Devereux 
and Sutherland (2010a).
4  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some evidence of the 
importance of a financial channel in the recent business cycle downturn. We then develop the 
basic two-country model in which investors and savers interact, but investors may be limited by 
                                                 
2 It is important to distinguish co-movement in final goods production from that of asset prices and consumption. In 
almost any international macro model, greater financial market integration will give rise to positive co-movement in 
consumption and asset prices. But, in the standard international RBC model with frictionless asset markets, financial 
integration will tend to imply negative co-movement in production (and physical investment) – see, for example, 
Backus et al. (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Heathcote and Perri (2002, 2005). The contribution here is to 
show that leverage constraints, together with financial integration, tend to generate positive co-movement in final 
goods production.  
3 An alternative mechanism where balance sheets play a key role in business cycles is the ‘financial accelerator’ 
model of Bernanke et al. (1999). This has been extended to a multi-country setting by Gilchrist (2004). 
4 Dedola and Lombardo (2009) develop an interesting model similar to the present paper based on the financial 
accelerator model of Bernake et al. (2000), incorporating endogenous portfolios as in the present paper. They 
emphasise a somewhat different type of transmission effect, unique to the financial accelerator model, coming from 
the direct connection between risk-premia across countries.    7
leverage constraints. In section 4 we explore the effects of a negative productivity shock in one 
country, and demonstrate the role of balance sheet adjustments in the propagation of business 
cycle shocks across countries. Section 5 then extends the model to allow for integrated bond 
markets, and section 6 considers the case of endogenous labor supply and investment. We then 
conclude. 
2. Empirical evidence  
We present some empirical evidence that supports our contention that balance sheet 
contractions may have been an important propagation mechanism for the current international 
crisis. First, Figure 1 documents the global nature of the economic crisis, demonstrating a 
remarkably synchronous collapse in economic growth rates for a sample of OECD countries. It is 
unlikely that trade linkages alone could account for the simultaneous downturns seen in all 
regions. If we take the US economy as the ultimate source of the financial crisis then it would be 
easy to explain the scale of the downturn in Mexico, for instance. But Figure 1 illustrates 
dramatic reductions in economic growth in many OECD economies, including some only 
marginally linked to the US through trade flows.  
In addition there is clear evidence that US banks reduced their outstanding claims on the 
rest of the world. Table 1 contains short-term claims of US banks, for all OECD countries for 
which data is available. This is the total stock among US reporting banks of all claims on the 
destination economy with less than one year remaining until maturity. Under normal 
circumstances new claims are issued and many maturing existing claims are rolled over each 
quarter. A rapid decline in less than one year, then, implies little new issuance, and few existing 
exposures being rolled over. There is a clear pattern overall that the largest OECD economies (by 
size of claims) experienced a substantial fall in short-term US bank claims during 2008,   8
including France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Korea and Luxembourg. Further, total claims across 
all countries declined by more than 20 percent, with half of that decline occurring in the final 
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1 Year-over-year changes in real GDP. AU = Australia, CA = Canada, CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, ES = 
Spain, FR = France, GB = United Kingdom, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, MX = Mexico, NL = Netherlands, US = United 
States. Source: national data. 
 
 
Aside from bank balance sheets, we can also find evidence consistent with balance sheet 
contractions in other instruments. Equities in particular were believed by some policymakers to 
be a vector of contagion, as the following quote by Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor of the 
Reserve Bank of India, indicated:  
“Our problems are mainly due to the sell-off by foreign institutional investors in the 
domestic equity markets leading to a sharp reduction in net capital inflows and the sharp 
slowdown in global economic activity and external demand.” (Mohan 2009)   9
 
Table 1 
Short term claims of US banks on OECD economies 
$US millions 
 Destination of Funds   2007Q4  2008Q1  2008Q2  2008Q3  2008Q4
 Austria  4179 4207 4841 3537 2256
 Belgium  8742 13911 17453 15630 15567
 Czech Republic  527 716 798 894 518
 Finland  3191 2837 2386 3024 2928
 France  57952 69098 41790 43719 55287
 Germany  56910 65933 48407 40111 39266
 Greece  3947 4857 3005 2164 2428
 Hungary  894 1003 900 1113 491
 Ireland  28317 27471 28082 27357 23550
 Italy  25180 25521 26215 17012 17243
 Korea  26254 27435 28027 29873 21518
 Luxembourg  26050 24730 22826 21398 11943
 Mexico  6492 7752 7497 6574 7734
 Netherlands  43132 46995 52071 45699 37230
 Poland  2356 2254 2279 2308 2521
 Portugal  2861 2331 2054 1549 1226
 Spain  28267 28367 25370 15853 18420
 Turkey  7320 6916 7014 6009 5107
 Source: BIS International Banking Statistics 
 
This view is consistent with the data on international capital flows captured by the Treasury 
International Capital System (Figure 2). The scale of the fall in both inflows and outflows 
starting in late 2008 is unprecedented over the full sample of aggregate TIC data going back to 
1980. In our model we will see that the balance sheet contractions implied by this, when 
combined with binding leverage constraints among investors, can impart an independent 
international transmission of shocks. 
 
   10
 
Figure 2
US capital inflows and outflows
1

























































































































































1 Foreign purchases and sales of long-term domestic and foreign securities.  
   Source: US Department of the Treasury. 
 
 
Financial linkages versus trade linkages  
The effects of global balance sheet adjustments should be expected to vary by country. 
Some economies are more dependent on capital inflows than others, and countries with low 
credit ratings may suffer more from a sudden reduction in flows than higher rated countries, for 
example. Empirical evidence of the effects of a financial channel should reflect differences in 
vulnerabilities across countries. 
We demonstrate the importance of balance sheet contractions as a propagation 
mechanism for the crisis using regression analysis. As a rough measure of the international effect   11
of the crisis, we use the change in the growth rate of real GDP between the year ended December 
2007 and December 2008. The vulnerability of countries to a sudden outflow of capital is 
calculated as total capital inflows from the US, as a percent of 2007 GDP, using US Treasury 
International Capital data (labeled TIC). Our sample includes all members of the OECD for 
which TIC data is available. We also include trade linkages, measured using exports to the US in 
2007 as a percent of GDP (X). Finally, we interact each of these variables with the sovereign 
credit rating of the economy (CR), to capture the idea that capital withdrawals are likely to affect 
lower rated economies more heavily than higher rated ones, due to “flight to quality.” Based on 
the Standard and Poor’s sovereign foreign currency credit rating in December 2007, we convert 
the credit rating to a numerical scale where a value of 0 corresponds to a AAA-rating, 1 to a 
AA+ rating, and so on, down to 12 for a BB- rating, the lowest in our sample. 
The results are given in Table 2, and provide strong support for our argument that 
financial flows were a significant causal factor in the propagation of the crisis, while trade 
channels appear less important. First the export variables (X and CRX) are never economically or 
statistically significant, and sometimes enter with the wrong sign. Second our measure of capital 
flows (TIC) is statistically significant in all cases. Third, when we include an interactive term 
between the credit rating and the size of capital inflows from the US, the interactive term enters 
not only significantly, consistent with flight-to-quality, but the statistical support for TIC is also 
further strengthened. Finally, the adjusted R-squared statistics are supportive of capital inflows 
playing an important role in explaining the downturn, with trade channels being less important.  
In summary, this evidence suggests that a financial channel may be important for the 
international propagation of shocks. Moreover, it is difficult to explain the scale and 
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2 -0.036  -0.072  0.133 0.278 0.294
Obs. 29  29  27 27 27
 
1 Dependent variable: real GDP growth rate in the year to 2008Q4, less the 
growth rate in the previous year. P-values are in parentheses; bold indicates 
significance at the 5% level. X equals exports to the US and TIC is gross 
capital inflows from the US, each as a percentage of GDP, in 2007. CRX 
and CRTIC are interactive terms, where CR is the S&P sovereign foreign 
currency credit rating in 2007. CR=0 corresponds to a AAA-rating, 1 for 
AA+, and so on, to 12 for BB-.  
 
 
3. The model 
In this section we describe a basic two-country model with borrowers and lenders in each 
country. The countries are called home and foreign. Within each country there are investors and 
savers, both of whom use the same fixed asset and have infinite horizons. Investors purchase the 
fixed asset and rent it to production firms, receiving a risky return in exchange. We may think of 
this investment as the purchase of an equity claim in the production firm. Investors are more 
impatient than savers, so they will borrow from savers in order to invest in the fixed asset.
5 
                                                 
5 Because they are more impatient than savers, investors will never accumulate enough resources to cover the cost of 
investment in any period.    13
Savers also make use of the fixed asset in home production. Savers therefore choose a portfolio 
in which they hold the debt of investors and the fixed asset. Savers do not hold domestic or 
foreign equity by assumption. We work with two versions of the model. In the first version 
savers lend only to domestic investors, so there is no cross country trade in non-contingent 
bonds. In the second version we allow for an open international bond market, so that investors 
may borrow from either domestic or foreign savers. 
Investors face leverage constraints. They issue debt, but the maximum amount they can 
issue depends on their net worth. We will examine separately cases where these leverage 
constraints are binding and non-binding.  
Whether or not leverage constraints bind, investors in either country may have the 
possibility of trading claims with investors in the other country so as to diversify their portfolio 
of equity holdings. Thus investors in each country finance their investment with debt, but may 
also have equity portfolios that are inter-connected across countries. Finally, both investors and 
savers in each country supply labor inelastically to production firms, and there is no physical 
capital accumulation. In section 6 we discuss how the model may be extended to accommodate 
endogenous capital accumulation and variable labor supply.  
The focus of the analysis is to explore the joint process of leverage constraints and 
international portfolio integration in propagating macroeconomic shocks across countries. 
Investors 
We normalize the population of each country to unity, with a measure n of investors and 
1 n   of savers. The representative investor in the home country maximizes: 






  ,   14
where 
I
s C  is consumption of the final good. To keep the analysis solely focused on financial 
inter-linkages between countries, it is assumed that there is just one world good. Adding an 
endogenous terms of trade to the analysis would enrich the response, but would not 
fundamentally alter the cross-country transmission of balance sheet adjustments modeled here, 
so long as the elasticity of substitution across home and foreign goods is not very close to unity.
6 
We define the discount factor for investors such that: 
1 (),
II I I
s ss C       
with  '( ) 0
II
s C    where 
I
s C  is the economy-wide average consumption of investors. Thus the 
rate of time preference of investors is increasing in consumption, but is taken as given by each 
individual investor. The assumption of endogenous time preference for investors plays the usual 
role of ensuring a stationary wealth distribution among groups, both within and across countries. 
But it also plays a key role in allowing for a comparison of an economy in which leverage 
constraints bind with one where they do not bind, as we discuss below.  
  Investors receive income from their current holdings of domestic and foreign equity, and 
labor income from working in the domestic production firm. In addition, they must repay their 
debts owed to domestic savers. They then issue new debt, purchase equity claims on home and 
foreign investments and consume. The home country investor’s budget constraint is written as: 
(2)   11 22 1 1 1 1 2 2 21 1 1 () ( )
II I I I II I
tt tt tt tK t t tK t t t t t Cq kq kW qRk qRk BR B            , 
                                                 
6 As is well known, with an elasticity of substitution equal to unity, there is a high cross-country correlation of 
consumption purely due to the risk sharing implications of a terms-of-trade adjustment. This is seen, for instance, in 
the paper by Dedola and Lombardo (2009). Aghion et al. (2004) explore the importance of terms-of-trade 
movements in affecting borrowing constraints in an emerging market economy framework. Extending our model to 
a setting with an endogenous terms-of-trade would affect borrowing constraints through the impact of a terms-of-
trade adjustment on net worth in a similar way to the effects of asset price changes in the present version of the 
model.   15
where  1t q  and  2t q  represent the price of the fixed asset (or equity) in the home and foreign 
country respectively, and  1
I
t k  and  2
I
t k  are the portfolio holdings of the fixed assets in each 
country held by the home investor. The fixed asset of the home (foreign) country earns a 
dividend of  1Kt R  ( 2Kt R ). 
I
t W  is wage income for the investor, who supplies one unit of labor. 
Finally, 
I
t B  is the debt issued to domestic savers and  11
I
tt R B    is payment on previously incurred 
debt.  
  One may question why only investors can purchase the fixed assets, which are then used 
by final goods firms. As in Bernanke et al. (1999), we could assume that investors (or, in their 
model, entrepreneurs) have some special capability for transforming a unit of the fixed asset into 
a usable factor of production that is rented to production firms. Savers cannot do this, and so may 
gain only indirectly from the investment, by lending to the investors. Savers can use the fixed 
asset only for use in home production, as described below.  
  In addition to constraint (2), investors face a constraint on total leverage due to an 
inability to commit to repayment, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Total debt is assumed to be 
restricted to be no greater than   times the market value of equity assets, where  1   . Thus 
home investors’ choices are constrained by: 
(3)   11 22 ()
II I
tt t t t B qk qk   . 
The full leverage rate (the value of assets to capital) for investors is then 1/(1 )    in the 
case where the leverage constraint (3) is binding. Leverage constraints in the form of (3) have 
been used quite widely in the literature on asset prices (Aiyagari and Gertler 1999), emerging 
market crises (Mendoza and Smith 2006), borrowing in a small open economy (Uribe 2006) and 
monetary policy with credit frictions in housing markets (Iacoviello, 2005). Kiyotaki and Moore   16
(1997) show that   may depend on the borrowing rate and expected capital gains on equity 
under some circumstances. We assume that   is a fixed parameter in our analysis.  
Investors in the home country choose a portfolio based on investments in the home equity 
and the foreign equity, as well as their total borrowing and consumption, to maximize their 
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(6)   1 '( ) ( ) '( )
II I I
ttt t t t UC E CUC R     ,  
where  is the multiplier on the leverage constraint. This may be interpreted as the shadow price 
(or marginal utility) of an extra unit of debt to the investor. If this is positive, it means that the 
investor would like to borrow more, but is constrained by (3). Thus  is a measure of the value 
of the opportunity to make a levered investment. To show this, put (4), (5) and (6) together to 
obtain: 
(7)  
1, 1 2, 1
1
(1 )
() ' ( )
1
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     
, 
where 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, /( ) tt tt tt t qk qk qk    is the share in home equity,  1, 1 1, 1 1 , 1 1, () / tt K t t rq R q      is the 
return on the home equity and
 
2, 1 2, 1 2 , 1 2, () / tt K t t rq R q     is the return on the foreign equity. 
Equation (7) shows that, when 0   , the expected return on the portfolio, up to the first-order, 
exceeds the cost of borrowing.    17
Note that the leverage constraint does not directly affect the investors’ incentive to 
diversify equity across countries, since (3) applies equally to borrowing for domestic or foreign 
equity purchases. Thus we may put (4) and (5) together to get the standard portfolio selection 
condition: 
(8)  

















  Given that the portfolio choice may be written in the form (8), we can derive the optimal 
equity portfolio of each country’s investors following Devereux and Sutherland (2010a). We 
discuss the details involved in portfolio choice more fully below.  
Savers 
Savers have preferences given by: 






  . 
As for investors, we define the discount factor such that  1 ()
SS S S
s ss C     , with  '( ) 0
SI
s C   , 
where 
I
s C  is the economy-wide aggregate consumption of savers. Assume that savers are 
inherently more ‘patient’ than investors, so that: 
( 1 0 )      () ()
SI x x   , 
for all feasible values of x. Assumption (10) ensures that savers will lend to investors, even in a 
steady state where the leverage constraint (3) is not binding.
7 
  Savers purchase the fixed asset, and buy debt from investors. They receive wage income 
from working in the final goods sector, and returns on their lending to investors. In addition they 
                                                 
7 An alternative, but considerably more difficult, approach to achieving an equilibrium with levered investment is to 
assume that investors are less risk averse than savers. Solving a model with leverage based on risk preferences 
would necessitate using a higher order of approximation to the full stochastic model.    18
have a residual ‘home production function’ that uses the fixed asset.
8 An individual saver owning 
1,
S
t k  of the fixed asset produces  1, ()
S
t Gk  in terms of home production, where  1, '( ) 0
S
t Gk  . For 
simplicity, we assume that home production is perfectly substitutable with the final good in 
savers’ utility.
9 With this assumption, we may write the saver’s budget constraint as: 
(11)   11 11 1 1 1 1 1 ()
SS SS SS S
tt t t t t t t t t Cq kWq k G k BR B         . 
Note that, by assumption, savers purchase only the domestic fixed asset. They do not 
have access to the same investment opportunities as investors and therefore only have use for the 
domestic fixed asset, as it may be utilized in home production. On the other hand, savers’ 
purchases of debt from investors are unconstrained.  
The first-order conditions for the optimal choice of  1
S
t k  and 
S
t B  are simply:  
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(13)   1 '( ) ( ) '( )
SS S S
ttt t t UC E CUC R    . 
 
Production firms 
  Production firms in each country hire labor and fixed assets in order to produce. Firms 
are competitive, and maximize profits given the production function: 
 (14)   1 (, ) ttt t YA F L K   , 
                                                 
8 As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), we think of this fixed asset as being more productive when used to produce final 
goods, and having a residual usage in home production for savers. According to this interpretation, savers do not 
receive dividend income on the use of the fixed asset in home production, since this is paid only on the 
‘transformed’ asset after its purchase by investors. 
9 Specifically, we define savers’ consumption as 
11 ˆ ()
SS S
tt t CCG k
  , where  ˆ S





 is savers’ home production.    19
where  t L  is effective employment and 
*
11 , 1 1 , 1 ()
II
tt t Kn k k     is the firm’s fixed assets. Profit 
maximization then implies that: 
(15)   11 (, ) tt t t WA F L K   , 
(16)   1, 2 1 (, ) Kt t t t RA F L K   . 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium of the two-country world economy entails market clearing for the world 
market of the fixed asset, as well as equilibrium in the debt market. First take the case where 
national debt markets are segmented, so that domestic investors borrow from domestic savers 
only. Then, for the home economy, it must be the case that:  
(17)   (1 ) 0
IS
tt nB n B  .  
In the case where there is a common world bond market, (17) is replaced by 
(17’)  
** () ( 1 ) () 0
II SS
tt tt nB B n B B    . 
For the home economy, equilibrium in the market for the fixed asset is defined as: 
(18)  
*
1, 1, 1, (1 ) 1
II S





t k  represents foreign country investors’ real holdings of the home asset at the beginning 
of time  1 t  . In addition, the world market clearing condition must be satisfied: 
(19)  
** *
1, 1 1, 1
** *
2 ,1 2 ,1 1 ,1 2 ,1
() ( 1 ) () ( 1 , ( ) )
(1, ( )) (1 )( ( ) ( )).
II SS I I
tt tt t t t
II S S
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
  
   
   
 
This condition incorporates the fact that the total labor supply of investors and savers sums to 
unity, and total use of the fixed factor by final goods firms is equal to total holdings by domestic 
and foreign investors.   20
We solve for four variants of the model and, in the process, conduct two experiments. We 
first assume that bond markets are segmented across countries, but equity markets are integrated 
internationally. We then solve separately for an equilibrium where the leverage constraint is 
slack and when the leverage constraint is binding.
10 Next we assume that international bond 
markets are integrated across countries, so that there is one world interest rate on bonds and, in 
addition, leverage constraints always bind. In this environment we contrast the properties of the 
economy where equity markets are separated (no cross holdings of equity) with an environment 
of full integration of equity markets (full portfolio diversification).  
The first experiment allows us to explore the effects of leverage constraints in a global 
economy where equity markets are integrated (although, as discussed below, we vary the degree 
of diversification in this case). The second experiment allows us to explore the implications of 
different forms of financial market integration in a global economy where leverage constraints 
are binding in each country.  
The equilibrium conditions may be characterized as follows. First, for the model with 
segmented national bond markets, integrated equity markets and slack leverage constraints, the 
full equilibrium is described by equations (2), (4)-(6), (11)-(13), (15)-(17) and (18) for both the 
home and foreign country, and the world market clearing condition (19). This gives 23 equations 
in the 22 variables 
I
t C , 
S
t C , 
*I
t C , 
*S
t C ,  1,
I
t k ,  2,
I
t k ,  1,
S














t B , 
S
t B , 
*I
t B , 
*S
t B ,  1,t q ,  2,t q , 
t R , 
*
t R ,  t W , 
*
t W , 1, K t R  and  2, K t R , with one equation redundant by Walras’ law (note that in this 
case, because leverage constraints never bind, we have  t   
* 0 t   ). In the case where leverage 
constraints always bind, the full equilibrium is described by equations (2)-(6), (11)-(13), (15)-
                                                 
10 The solution approach we use does not allow us to accommodate an outcome with ‘occasionally binding’ leverage 
constraints.    21
(17) and (18) for both the home and foreign country, and the world market clearing condition 
(19). This gives 25 equations in the 24 variables 
I
t C , 
S
t C , 
*I
t C , 
*S
t C ,  1,
I
t k ,  2,
I
t k ,  1,
S














t B , 
S
t B , 
*I
t B , 
*S
t B ,  1,t q ,  2,t q ,  t R , 
*
t R ,  t  , 
*
t  ,  t W , 
*
t W ,  1, K t R  and  2, K t R , with one equation 
redundant by Walras’ law.  
In the case with a common world bond market, leverage constraints and segmented 
international equity markets, we have conditions (2)-(4), (6), (11)-(13), (15)-(16) and (18) for the 
home country, and analogous expressions for the foreign country, while condition (17) for each 
country is replaced by the single condition (17’) which, in conjunction with (19), gives us 22 
equations in 21 variables 
I
t C , 
S
t C , 
*I
t C , 
*S
t C ,  1,
I
t k ,  1,
S








t k , 
I
t B , 
S
t B , 
*I
t B , 
*S
t B ,  1,t q ,  2,t q , 
t R ,  t  , 
*
t  ,  t W , 
*
t W ,  1, K t R  and  2, K t R .
11 Finally, in the case with a common world bond market, 
leverage constraints and integrated world equity markets, we add condition (5) to the previous 
list for the home country, along with its analogue for the foreign country, and we now solve for 
two additional variables,  2,
I




t k .  
Although this fully describes the set of equilibrium conditions and endogenous variables 
for each version of the model, the solution method involves taking a linear approximation around 
a non-stochastic steady state version of each model. In this case, a well-known difficulty arises 
due to the problem of determining the portfolio holdings of investors in a non-stochastic steady 
state. In particular, if equity markets are integrated and both assets are to be held by investors, 
equilibrium must be characterized by indifference among investors, at the margin, between 
holdings of home and foreign equities. This implies that, in a non-stochastic steady state, the 
assets must command identical returns, and there is no unique optimal portfolio share for an 
                                                 
11 Note that in this case there are no international cross-holdings of equity.   22
investor. But using the method of Devereux and Sutherland (2010a), the characteristics of the 
equilibrium portfolio may be approximated. The method allows for a derivation of the zero-order 
(or steady state) component of the equilibrium portfolio using a second order approximation of 
the portfolio selection equation, in conjunction with a first order approximation of the remaining 
parts of the model. This approximation gives us the degree to which investors in each country 
will choose to be exposed to equity markets in the other country, and allows an analysis of the 
stochastic equilibrium of the first-order approximation to the model with integrated world equity 
markets.
12  
It is important to emphasize that this indeterminacy of portfolio shares up to a first order 
approximation applies only to the choice of home and foreign equity conditional on the 
allocation of the fixed asset between the final goods sector and the home production sector in 
each country. This allocation itself, giving the total supply of equity, denoted by 
*
1, 1, 1, ˆII I
ttt kkk  
for the home economy and 
*
2, 2, 2, ˆII I
ttt kkk  for the foreign economy, is clearly determinate in a 
non-stochastic steady state, as evidenced by equations (19) (for the case without leverage 
constraints) or (20) (for the case with leverage constraints). Thus, the total supply of equity is 
determinate in a steady state, but the ownership pattern must be obtained using higher order 
approximations. In the impulse responses discussed below, we report the dynamics of total 
equity, which can be obtained from a simple linear approximation, rather than the dynamics of 
the investors’ equity portfolios (which would require a second order approximation to the model 
as described in Devereux and Sutherland (2010b)).  
Properties of the steady state 
                                                 
12 This aspect of the solution method is described in more detail in an appendix available from the authors.   23
Before examining the dynamics of balance sheet adjustments within the model, we first 
discuss some properties of the non-stochastic steady state. Since the model is symmetric and 
there is a stationary wealth distribution, the steady state is identical in the two types of bond 
market arrangements.  
When leverage constraints do not bind, it follows from a combination of (4) and (6), 
together with (12), (13) and (16), that the fixed asset is allocated efficiently between the final 
good sector and home production. That is, for the home economy, we have: 
(20)   12 1 ˆ '( ) (1, )
SI Gk A F n k  , 
Where  1 ˆI nk  represents the total quantity of the fixed asset used in the final goods production 
sector and 
*
111 ˆII I kkk . Thus the marginal product of the fixed asset is equalized between home 
production and final goods production.  
In combination with the resource constraint  11 ˆ (1 ) 1
IS nk n k   , this uniquely determines 
the allocation of assets in final goods production. Therefore there is no interdependence across 
countries in asset allocation in steady state when leverage constraints do not bind. In fact, we can 
extend this result further. In the case where leverage constraints never bind it is easy to see that 
there is no interaction between asset allocations across countries at all, at least up to a first-order 
approximation. This can be seen by taking a linear approximation of (4), (6), (12), (13) and (16) 
to obtain the condition:  












  ,  
where  1   and  2   are constant coefficients. Hence the dynamic paths of asset allocations are 
independent across countries, despite the fact that, up to a first-order, expected returns on all 
assets are equalized both within and across countries.    24
A more general feature of this environment is that the degree of financial integration does 
not affect the allocation of real assets. That is, allocation of the fixed asset between home 
production and investment in the final good is independent of the ownership of equities. This 
property does not hold in an economy with binding leverage constraints.
13 
When leverage constraints bind, we again use (4), (6), (12), (13) and (16) to obtain the 
steady state condition: 
(21)   12 1
(1 ) ˆ '( ) ( , )
(1 ) ( )
IS
SI
SI S I Gk A FL n k






From condition (3) it must be true that (1 )/[ (1 ) ( )] 1
IS SI S I          . It 
follows that, under binding leverage constraints, the final goods sector has an inefficiently low 
level of the fixed asset. More generally, however, since discount factors are endogenous, the 
allocation of fixed assets across sectors will no longer be independent across countries. With free 
trade in equities across countries, returns to investors must be equal in both countries. Since 
returns interact with movements in consumption through the endogenous rate of time preference, 
(21) shows that the division of resources between home production and final goods must be 
linked across countries as well. Even in the case of constant time preference, however, the 
presence of leverage constraints would still imply a dynamic interaction between output levels 
across countries, because productivity shocks to one country will affect the tightness of leverage 
constraints across all financial markets. We explore this in detail below.  
Portfolio choice 
                                                 
13 In a more general model with endogenous capital accumulation and variable labor supply, the degree of financial 
integration will affect business cycle correlations across countries. As discussed in the introduction, however, 
financial integration generally reduces the co-movement of business cycles across countries in the standard model 
(Heathcote and Perri 2004). The main point here is to show that the presence of balance sheet constraints introduces 
substantial forces for positive cross-country correlations that would otherwise be absent. In section 6 below, we 
discuss how the results extend to a model with capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply.    25
Equations (20) or (21) determine the steady state allocation of the fixed asset in final 
goods production, with non-binding or binding leverage constraints respectively. This determines 
the total supply of equity in each country. But the share of each country’s equity held by home 
and foreign investors (the portfolio shares  1
I k  and 
*
1
I k ) must also be determined. Clearly, in order 
to analyze the dynamic response to productivity shocks in one country, it is necessary to 
understand the pattern of equity holdings of investors in each country. To do this we follow 
Devereux and Sutherland (2010a) in using a second-order expansion of (8) to obtain an 
approximation of optimal portfolio holdings.
14  
In practice it is convenient to rewrite the model to determine the net international equity 
position of each country. Since only investors have access to equity markets by assumption, it is 
sufficient to look at the portfolio decisions of home and foreign investors. First take the budget 
constraint for home country investors (2). This may be rewritten as: 
(22)      11 1 11 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () ( )
II I I I I I I I
t tt K t t t t t ttx t t t t t t t C NFA W R k q k k r NFA r q k k B R B                 ,
 
where  t NFA  denotes net foreign assets, defined as  22 1 1 1 ˆ ()
I II
tt t t t t NFA q k q k k  , which is the 
excess of the home investors’ holdings of foreign equity relative to foreign investors’ holdings of 
domestic equity. In addition,  xt r  is the ex-post excess return on the portfolio: 
11 , 22 ,
12
11 21






   
    
  
. 
For given  t NFA , the portfolio choice may be described as the choice of  11 11 11 ˆ ()
II
ttt t qk k     , 
which is the net holding of home country equity by home agents. If  0 t   , the investors 
diversify in the sense that less than 100 percent of all home equity is owned by home investors. 
                                                 
14 A detailed description of the solution approach is contained in an appendix available from the authors.    26
Given  t NFA , home investors’ holdings of foreign equity are equal to tt NFA    and equation (22) 
is the only part of the model where the portfolio term  t  enters. But it is still necessary to obtain 
a solution for  t  in order to characterize how equity markets affect international transmission. 
Devereux and Sutherland (2010a) show that, when the properties of the model are analyzed up to 
a first-order approximation,  t   is a constant and is determined by a combination of a second-
order approximation of (8), together with a first-order approximation of the rest of the model.
15  
In the solution below, following Tille and van Wincoop (2007), we extend (8) to allow 
for transactions costs of international financial trade that effectively limit international portfolio 
diversification. This represents a brute-force technique for generating home equity bias. In 
particular, we assume that an ‘iceberg’ cost factor given by exp( ) 1     reduces the returns that 
home investors receive from foreign investment so that condition (8) becomes: 
(8’)  




'( ) exp( ) 0













In addition, we follow Tille and Van Wincoop in assuming that   is a small, second-order term. 
This means that while it does affect the solution for the equilibrium portfolio, which is evaluated 
using a second-order approximation of (8’), it does not impact on the first-order dynamics of the 
model, except insofar as it affects the choice of the portfolio itself.  
   Note that given the definition of net foreign assets, the leverage constraint for home 
country investors may be written: 
(23)   11 ˆ ()
I
tt t t BN F A q k   . 
                                                 
15 Note that the constant approximation for 
t   is the only aspect of the portfolio solution that is explicitly 
incorporated in the model. Given this approximation, all other aspects of the model can be analyzed using a first 
order approximation, including the dynamics of total equity (the part of the fixed asset invested in final goods 
production). As emphasized above, in order to compute the dynamics of the ownership of equity (the dynamics 
of
t  ), it would be necessary to solve the model using a higher order of approximation.   27
Thus, holding home asset prices constant, an increase in net foreign assets generated by either a 
current account surplus or a capital gain on the external portfolio (i.e. valuation effects) will 
loosen the leverage constraint. But since 
* 0 tt NFA NFA   , this will simultaneously tighten the 
leverage constraint facing foreign investors. Therefore the degree to which leverage linkages 
govern the transmission of shocks across countries depends on the dynamics of net foreign 
assets, and these in turn are linked to the portfolio choices made by home and foreign investors. 
Calibration 
  Because this version of the model is such a stripped-down representation of a full-scale 
DSGE framework, lacking capital accumulation and dynamics in labor supply and containing 
only a single world good, there are many dimensions in which the model’s predictions will 
depart from reality. The aim of the exercise is solely to explore the way in which the interaction 
of leverage constraints and portfolio interdependence affect the cross-country dynamics of asset 
prices, asset allocations and levered investments. To do this, however, we need to choose 
parameter values for preferences, production technologies and the leverage constraint itself. 
Table 3 gives the set of parameter values used in the baseline model.  
 
Table 3  
Calibration 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value 
n  Proportion of investors  0.5     Capital share in final goods production  0.36 
   Discount function  0.022     Capital share in home production  0.1 
   Discount function  See text     Coefficient of relative risk aversion  2 
   Leverage   0.5, 0.75     Productivity shock persistence   0.9   28
  We assume that the measure of investors and savers is equal, so that  0.5 n  . In the 
leverage constrained economy, this accords with the estimates of Campbell and Mankiw (1990) 
regarding the share of households that are subject to credit constraints in the US economy.  
In the model with binding leverage constraints, total leverage (investment relative to 
capital) is equal to1/(1 )   . The leverage ratio has a significant effect on the quantitative 
dynamics. We examine two alternatives. First we choose a relatively low ratio of 2 ( 0.5   ), as 
in Bernanke and Gertler (1999). But, given the high rates of leverage seen in the financial system 
in recent years, we also explore the implications of a higher value of  0.75   , corresponding to 
total leverage of 4. While the impact of shocks is greater for higher leverage (when the leverage 
constraint is binding), qualitatively the results are similar for both leverage ratios.  
We assume a discount factor defined as: 
() ( 1 ), ,
ii CC i I S
 
  . 
Following Mendoza (2006), we set  0.022   . We choose   for savers to match an annual 
interest rate of 4 percent, and the value of  for investors so that, in a steady state with binding 
leverage constraints, investors face a shadow price of borrowing that effectively imposes an 
interest premium on borrowed funds of two percentage points, which requires that 0.955
I   .
16 
This follows the calibration of the borrowing premium in Bernanke et al. (1999).  
In the model without leverage constraints, it is necessary to use a different approach to 
calibrate the discount factor. In that case, we choose 
S   and 
I   jointly to match a steady state 
annual interest rate of 4 percent and to ensure that borrowing by investors is such that the 
leverage ratio matches that of the economy with binding leverage constraints. In the 
                                                 
16 From (6), this entails choosing 
I   so that /[ ( ) ' ( )]
II I CUC   is 0.02 in steady state.    29
case 0.75   , this requires that  .99
S    and  .9735
I   . When  0.5   , .9825
S    and 
.975
I   . 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas final goods production technology, and let
1 (, ) FLK L K
    . 
We set  0.36   , the conventional measure of the share of capital in US GDP.
17 Regarding the 
home production sector, we assume that  1 ()
S GZ k
   and  0.1   , implying that the fixed asset 
is less important in this sector.
18 We set  1 A Z    in steady state. The combination of these 
assumptions and other calibrated parameters implies that, in steady state, 80 percent of the fixed 
asset is employed in final goods production.  
We follow the standard business cycle literature in setting an elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution equal to 0.5, so that  2    in 
1 () / ( 1 ) UC C
 
   . Alternative values of   change 
the volatility of asset prices, but have little qualitative effect on the results otherwise.  
What are the appropriate shocks to focus on? While the recent crisis has raised awareness 
of shocks to the financial system, our model lacks any detailed financial structure. It is not easy 
to pinpoint any key crisis-generating shock within the model. Instead, we follow the standard 
macro-RBC literature and look at the international propagation of productivity shocks in the final 
goods sector. The stochastic process for final goods productivity is modeled as: 
(24)   1 log( ) log( ) , tt t AA      
                                                 
17 In order to have substantial propagation effects from leverage constraints, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) require that 
production in the borrowing sector is linear in the fixed asset. Kocherlakota (2000) shows that, with a more 
conventional calibration allowing for decreasing returns, credit constraints have much less impact. Cordoba and 
Ripoll (2004) extend the Kocherlakota analysis to a general equilibrium, two sector economy similar to ours. They 
show that borrowing constraints of the type used in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) impart little amplitude to the effect 
of shocks on total output unless sectors differ substantially in the share of capital in production. Our interpretation 
differs from theirs by focusing on the distinction between the final goods sector and a home production sector. In 
addition, our main focus is not on amplification per se, but on the impact of leverage constraints and portfolio 
integration on the international transmission of shocks. Our results, showing that these two features enhance the 
international transmission of shocks, still obtain under the alternative interpretation that aggregate output is the sum 
of output from both sectors.  
18 Benhabib et al. (1991) calibrate the share of capital in home production equal to 0.08.    30
where  0.9   , 1 0 tt E     and 
22 0.02    . We assume that foreign productivity is driven by the 
same process, and foreign and domestic productivity shocks are uncorrelated.  
 
4. The effects of leverage constraints on international transmission  
In this section we compare the impact of a productivity shock in one country in an 
environment where leverage constraints are absent with that where investors in both countries 
are subject to binding leverage constraints. In both cases we assume that investors have 
diversified equity portfolios, potentially constrained only by second-order iceberg costs of capital 
flows, as described in (8’). The iceberg cost   is set so as to ensure that domestic investors hold 
75 percent of the home equity portfolio. We will also examine the case without these costs, so 
that investors have fully diversified equity portfolios. In addition, this section focuses on the case 
where national bond markets are segmented. Section 5 below analyzes the case with a single 
world bond market.  
No leverage constraints 
Figures 3 and 4 describe the impact of a one percent negative productivity shock in the 
home country, when the leverage constraint is not binding, relaxing (3). The figures describe the 
response of total consumption of final goods,
19 asset prices, investor borrowing, asset allocation, 
the home country trade surplus and the internal lending rate in each country. Figure 3 represents 
the case where portfolio diversification is restricted by second-order transactions costs, as 
described above. Investors in the home country then choose values for  1
I k  and  2
I k  to satisfy (8’), 
evaluated up to
 second-order, where the parameter   has been chosen so that home investors 
hold 75 percent of home equity ( 11 ˆ .75
II kk  ).  
                                                 
19 We define total consumption of final goods as  (1 )( ( ))
IS I
tt t nC n C G k   .   31
Figure 3
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1 Impulse responses of a one percent negative productivity shock when the leverage constraint is assumed to not bind 
(relaxing equation 3), and there is incomplete portfolio diversification ( 0   ). 
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Figure 4
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1 Impulse responses of a one percent negative productivity shock when the leverage constraint is assumed to not bind 
(relaxing equation 3), and there is complete portfolio diversification ( 0   ). 
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Figure 4 describes the case of unrestricted portfolios. In this case, the choices of  1
I k  and  2
I k  
satisfy (8). This involves home investors having a bias against home equities. Since investors are 
exposed to non-diversifiable risk from wage income, and wages are positively correlated with the 
return on home equity, they will hedge this risk by taking a larger position in foreign equity than 
home equity, as noted by Baxter and Jehrmann (1997).  
A fall in  t A  causes an immediate fall in current output in the home country and 
temporarily reduces wages for both savers and investors. This would lead both savers and 
investors to increase their desired borrowing at the initial interest rates, so that net saving falls. If 
there was no cross-country equity trade, real interest rates would have to rise sufficiently so as to 
ensure that net saving equals zero. At the same time, the direct fall in the return on the fixed asset 
would lead investors to reduce their demand for this asset, leading to a reduction in within-
country borrowing of investors from savers, and precipitating a fall in the asset price. This fall in 
the asset price would lead savers to purchase more of the fixed asset. Thus, without international 
equity trade, adjustment would involve higher real interest rates, a lower asset price and a lower 
share of the fixed asset in the final goods sector, with all these variables gradually returning to 
their initial steady state.  
  In the two-country world economy with equity trade, the adjustment process is facilitated 
by the immediate valuation effects on home country net foreign assets, and the subsequent 
dynamics in net foreign assets due to changes in equity holdings. The international transmission 
of the shock to consumption depends on the degree of portfolio diversification, and the 
movement in asset returns. The home country has a negative net position in its own stock 
( 11 11 11 ˆ () 0
II
ttt t qk k      ). Since asset returns must be equalized, up to a first order, the fall in 
asset prices in the home economy leads to a fall in the foreign asset price. But the ex-post excess   34
return on home assets immediately following the shock is negative ( 0 xt r  ), and the combination 
of this and the home country’s portfolio position ensures that the home country receives a 
positive portfolio valuation effect. In fact, with fully unrestricted diversification, foreign 
investors are more exposed to home equity, and suffer a bigger valuation loss on their portfolio, 
than home investors because home asset prices fall by more than foreign asset prices. Thus the 
home and foreign consumption responses in Figure 4 are more alike than in Figure 3, because 
there is more portfolio diversification among investors.  
The subsequent adjustment in the two-country world economy is characterized by the 
home economy running a persistent trade deficit. This is financed by home country investors 
reducing their holdings of both home and foreign equities over time, and foreign country 
investors increasing their holdings of both equities. Since world real interest rates are higher 
following the shock, the foreign country as a whole increases its savings rate to absorb the 
greater holdings of equity.  
The key feature of both Figures 3 and 4, however, is that there the shock does not affect 
the allocation of the fixed asset in the foreign country.
20 Since the foreign asset allocation is 
governed by (20) up to a first order, optimal investment is unaffected by the shock to home 
productivity. This means that there is no fall in lending between foreign savers and foreign 
investors. In fact, within-country borrowing in the foreign country rises, moving in the opposite 
direction to that in the home country.
21 In this sense, there is no international transmission of 
balance sheet contractions.  
                                                 
20 Again, we note that in this and subsequent figures, the asset dynamics refer to total equity in each country (or 
equivalently, the shares of the fixed asset in the final goods sectors) 
1,
ˆI
t k  and 
2,
ˆI
t k , rather than the division of this 
equity between the portfolios of home and foreign investors.  
21 In fact, since foreign lenders do not interact with home agents, foreign investors are effectively borrowing from 
foreign lenders in order to purchase more home and foreign equity during the transition. In the home country, the   35
In the economy without leverage constraints, then, the international transmission of 
shocks is limited, and clearly counterfactual, relative to the discussion of the empirical evidence 
of financial spillovers in section 2. A negative productivity shock in the home country leads to 
balance sheet contractions domestically as investors reduce both their borrowing and holdings of 
fixed assets. But there are no foreign balance sheet contractions. Equity portfolio integration 
allows for the consumption effects of productivity shocks to be diversified across countries, but 
it does not in itself influence the real effects of the shock on investment and output.
22  
Leverage constraints and international transmission 
  The impact of a negative productivity shock in the home country, when leverage 
constraints bind in both countries, is shown in Figures 5-7. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the case 
where the leverage ratio is 4, the former when investors’ portfolios are only partly diversified 
due to the presence of transactions costs and the latter with unrestricted portfolio diversification.  
  As before, the fall in home country productivity leads to a fall in asset prices in both 
countries and, through the valuation effects of ex-post asset return differentials between the 
home and foreign portfolios, to an increase in net foreign assets for the home country, and a fall 
in investors’ consumption in both countries. But in this environment asset prices have a 
secondary effect, beyond the wealth redistribution channel, through the return on portfolios. The 
fall in asset prices leads to a tightening of the leverage constraint in both the home and foreign 
countries. For the home country, the fall in  1t q leads to a fall in net worth and, for given NFA, 
requires a reduction in borrowing. With a diversified portfolio, however, the shock also generates 
a valuation effect, causing a compensating rise in NFA. But this leads to negative movement in 
                                                                                                                                                             
dynamic is the opposite – home investors reduce their borrowing from home savers (at least initially), financed by 
sales of equity to foreign investors.  
22 Again, we note that, with endogenous labour supply and capital accumulation, the degree of portfolio 
diversification would impact on the international transmission of shocks, but this would generally imply negative 
transmission.    36
foreign NFA, and a tightening of the foreign leverage constraint, also requiring a reduction in 
borrowing in the foreign country. The result is a reduction in borrowing by investors in both 
countries, and a consequent reduction in investment in fixed assets in the final goods sector. 
Thus Figure 5 illustrates that foreign investment falls sharply, by the same order of magnitude as 
home investment. Note that, for the foreign country, there is no fall in the productivity of the 
domestic final goods sector. Despite that, there is a fall in investment in final goods in the 
foreign country. This fall in investment takes place purely through balance sheet linkages. 
The positive relationship between the movement in an asset price and demand for this 
asset represents the essence of the ‘upward sloping demand curve’ for assets that characterizes 
episodes of balance sheet contractions forced by binding leverage constraints (see, for instance, 
Aiyagari and Gertler 1999). Here it is taking place as a spillover from one levered investor to 
another, as emphasized by Krugman (2008). That is, a fall in the price of the asset held by one 
investor leads to a tightening of leverage constraints and a fall in demand for both the original 
asset and other assets held in the investor’s portfolio.  
Even in the case where portfolios are only partly diversified (Figure 5), there is a high 
correlation across countries in borrowing and investment. The balance sheet contraction is so 
great that the interest rate on debt in each country immediately falls. Again, note that this is in 
response to a temporary shock so that future consumption of investors is expected to increase. 
But because investors are subject to leverage constraints, the path of their consumption is de-
linked from the path of interest rates.    37
Figure 5
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and incomplete portfolio diversification ( 0   ). 
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Figure 6
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Since consumption falls for both home and foreign investors, but is expected to rise in the future, 
real interest rates would tend to rise in an unrestricted environment.
23 But this effect is more than 
offset by the increase in the shadow price of borrowing due to the leverage constraint. This leads 
to a large fall in the supply of debt to savers, and a fall in market real interest rates.  
  There is a distinct difference in this model between the constrained and unconstrained 
economy, not just in the direction of the international transmission of shocks, but also in the 
scale of the effects. In the unconstrained economy, not only is there an absence of international 
transmission via balance sheet contractions, but the domestic impact of the shock is also 
relatively mild. A one percent decline in final goods’ sector productivity leads only to an 
approximately 0.25 percent reduction in fixed asset investment. By contrast, the response of the 
constrained economy is an order of magnitude larger. Domestic investment in fixed assets falls 
by 1.7 percent. Even in the foreign economy the effect of the shock is very large – investment 
falls by 1.3 percent. In both countries, the response to the shock is proportionally much larger 
than the shock itself, due to the interaction between asset price declines and binding leverage 
constraints. Consumption also falls by slightly more in the constrained economy than in the 
unconstrained economy, although this decline is less persistent.  
  When portfolio diversification is unrestricted, Figure 6 shows that the international 
transmission of the shocks is heightened further. In fact, we get the surprising prediction that the 
size of the balance sheet contraction and disinvestment is greater in the foreign country than in 
the home country! Investment in the foreign economy falls by 1.6 percent, but only 1.2 percent 
in the domestic economy.  
                                                 
23 There is not a strict relationship between expected consumption growth and real interest rates, up to a first-order, 
due to the presence of endogenous time preference. Nevertheless, since the time preference parameter  is very 
small, for practical purposes the consumption growth-real interest rate linkage holds quite closely in the model. Note 
also that, because interest rate movements are non-monotonic, the same will (approximately) hold for the non-
borrowing constrained savers in each country.    40
  Why does greater portfolio diversification magnify the international propagation effects 
of the shock? The reason is clear from (3) or (23). Increased diversification leads to a greater 
sensitivity of foreign balance sheets to the domestic asset price, and therefore a larger balance 
sheet contraction in response to a negative shock to home productivity. In the completely 
unrestricted portfolio equilibrium (when  0   ), the foreign country is over-weighted in home 
equity as part of an optimal risk sharing arrangement. So the macroeconomic reverberations of 
the shock are greater in the foreign country than the domestic country, despite the fact that the 
actual shock takes place only in the home economy. Thus, in this example, the ownership pattern 
of equity holdings, through its implication for balance sheet constraints, is more important for the 
business cycle response than is the geographical source of macro shocks.  
Figure 7 shows the results with a lower degree of leverage (equal to 2), when portfolio 
diversification is restricted by transactions costs (the case of full diversification is very similar 
and is omitted for brevity). Qualitatively the results are very similar, although the amplification 
effect of shocks is lower when leverage is smaller. The presence of binding leverage constraints 
still generates a high positive co-movement in borrowing and real investment between countries.   
   41
Figure 7
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5. Portfolio Integration and international transmission 
In this section we examine the version of the model that allows for an integrated world 
market for non-contingent bonds. Now investors may borrow at the same interest rate from either 
domestic or foreign savers. We use this version to explore the impact of equity market 
integration in the presence of leverage constraints. That is, in contrast to the previous section 
where we compared the effects of a productivity shock assuming integrated equity markets (to a 
greater or lesser degree, depending on the value of ), both with and without leverage 
constraints, here we assume that leverage constraints are always binding, but we contrast the case 
with and without equity market integration.
24  
Figure 8 illustrates the impact of a shock to productivity in the home country in the model 
with a common bond market, but without equity market integration. In this environment, the 
transmission of macroeconomic shocks across countries is negative!
25  
                                                 
24 This was not possible in the previous section because, absent equity market integration, the two countries were 
effectively in autarky, since bond markets were segmented by country.  We note also that Dedola and Lombardo 
(2009) look at various degrees of portfolio integration.  
25 We focus only on the high leverage case here. The impact of portfolio integration in the case with lower leverage 
is qualitatively similar, in the sense that portfolio integration increases macroeconomic co-movement when 
compared with the economy without equity market integration. However, in the economy without integration and 
lower leverage (the counterpart of Figure 8), the co-movement is likely to be positive rather than negative since a 
negative productivity shock will tend to raise rather than lower world lending rates with low leverage. Thus the case 
of negative co-movement depends on both the absence of portfolio integration and high levels of leverage. 
Nevertheless, the main result that follows – that equity market integration increases macroeconomic co-movement – 
remains even with low leverage.    43
Figure 8
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As before, a decline in home country productivity reduces investment, borrowing and 
aggregate consumption in the home economy. But because the borrowing rate is identical in both 
countries, and the fall in the demand for funds on the part of home investors pushes down the 
borrowing rate, the demand for funds in the foreign country rises, increasing borrowing and 
investment in the fixed asset by foreign investors. Foreign total consumption rises, as the fall in 
interest rates encourages an increase in spending, and the rise in foreign investment increases 
production of final goods in the foreign country. In contrast to the case without an integrated 
world bond market, the home country’s trade balance now moves into surplus, rather than 
deficit.  
The different responses of home and foreign investment lead asset prices to move in 
opposite directions in the two countries. There is an asset price decline in the home country, for 
the same reasons as before. In the foreign country, by contrast, the increase in demand for the 
fixed asset raises the price of that asset. Thus the end result is that consumption, investment, and 
asset prices move in opposite directions in the two countries when there is an integrated world 
bond market but no equity market integration. Notice also that the amplification effects of the 
shock on domestic investment and asset prices are substantially bigger in this case than in 
Figures 5 or 6. Because equity prices across countries are not directly related through arbitrage, 
home country asset prices fall by more, and the impact on the leverage constraint is amplified, 
relative to the case with equity market integration.  
Figure 9 now takes the same shock, but allows for both bond and equity market 
integration, assuming unrestricted equity holdings (the case with iceberg costs on equity returns 
is very similar, and is omitted for brevity). In this case there is a clear positive co-movement 
across countries. Qualitatively, the transmission is similar to Figures 5 and 6, except now there is   45
a single world debt market. The shock leads to a fall in the price of the home asset and, from 
arbitrage condition (8), the foreign asset price also falls. Given the hedged portfolio position of 
the home country, the fall in the return on the home asset leads to an increase in home NFA due 
to valuation effects. For the foreign country these valuation effects are negative, leading to a 
tightening of the leverage constraint on foreign investors. As in Figures 5 and 6, total borrowing, 
investment and consumption fall in both countries. The world real interest rate on debt also falls, 
as the demand for borrowing by both home and foreign investors declines.  
A comparison between Figures 8 and 9 illustrates that, conditional on leverage 
constrained investment, portfolio integration itself causes a dramatic qualitative shift in the 
international transmission of productivity shocks. Absent equity market integration, shocks are 
transmitted negatively to consumption, asset prices and investment. There would thus be a clear 
incentive to diversify country specific risk through equity market integration. But integrating 
equity markets in the presence of binding leverage constraints causes a sharp change in the 
nature of international transmission itself. Without leverage constraints, as we have seen, there 
would be no such effects. Real investment would be entirely independent across countries in this 
basic model, and opening up financial markets in equity trade would have no effect on co-
movement whatsoever, aside from the direct effect on consumption risk-sharing. But with 
binding leverage constraints, portfolio diversification leads to large shifts in net worth across 
countries in response to country-specific shocks. These net worth changes interact with leverage 
constraints to cause highly synchronized movements in investment demand across countries. 
Thus, the ex-post gains to diversification, after financial integration, are diminished relative to 
ex-ante ‘perceived’ gains from equity market integration.    46
Figure 9
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Equivalently we can observe that, while financial integration through equity markets 
allows for a positive gain from cross country risk-sharing, it also generates a ‘contagion’ effect in 
the presence of leverage constraints on investment. This contagion effect works through cross-
country changes in net worth, affecting investment and increasing the degree of macroeconomic 
co-movement relative to that which would obtain in the absence of portfolio integration.  
Unconditional moments 
Table 4 reports the unconditional moments of the model under the assumption that 
productivity shocks in both countries follow identical but uncorrelated distributions, given by 
(24). As is evident from the figures, the model with binding leverage constraints displays 
substantially more overall volatility than the model where leverage constraints are absent. 
Aggregate consumption is 50 percent more volatile with high leverage constraints. Asset price 
volatility is relatively unchanged with and without leverage constraints, but investment volatility 
is vastly higher, as is clear from a comparison of Figures 3 and 5. Investment is essentially 
uncorrelated across countries in the economy without leverage constraints, but almost perfectly 
correlated in the economy with leverage constraints. Table 4 therefore underscores the main 
message of the paper. In the presence of credit market imperfections, balance sheet linkages 
across financial institutions can generate a very powerful mechanism for the international 
transmission of business cycle shocks. The table also shows that, in the presence of leverage 
constraints, international portfolio diversification can lead to a dramatic change in macro-
economic co-movement. The cross-country correlations of consumption, asset prices and 
investment switch from negative to positive when equity markets are opened and leverage 
constraints are binding. Note, however, that overall macro volatility is still substantially reduced 
by financial integration, as suggested by Figure 9.    48
Table 4  
Unconditional moments 
International 







High High Low Low High High 
International equity 
diversification 
Partial  Full  Partial Full Partial Full None Full 
Corresponding 
figure 
3  4 5  6 7  —  8  9 
SDEV( ) C   1.9 1.9 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.4 4.7  2.8 
1 SDEV( ) q   2.2 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.5 3.2  2.2 
SDEV( ) R   0.2 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 1.0  1.0 
1 ˆ SDEV( )
I k   0.3 0.3 3.5 3.5 2.0 2.1 7.7  3.4 
* CORR( , ) CC   0.87 0.96 0.89 0.97 0.86 0.98 -0.37  0.98 
12 CORR( , ) qq   0.94 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.91 -0.26  0.92 
12 ˆˆ CORR( , )
II kk  -0.03 0.01 0.96 0.90 0.96 0.92 -0.63  0.98 
* CORR( , ) R R   1.00 1.00 0.99 0.92 0.97 0.63 1.00  1.00 
1 Unconditional moments if productivity shocks follow identical but uncorrelated distributions in 
both countries, with varying degrees of market integration and levels of leverage. High (low) 
leverage constraints corresponds to  0.75   (0.5). Partial and full international equity 
diversification correspond to  0    and  0    respectively. C (
* C ) is domestic (foreign) 
consumption; 
1 q  (
2 q ) is domestic (foreign) equity prices; R (





ˆI k ) is the quantity of domestic (foreign) fixed assets used in final goods production. 
 
6. Extending the model: endogenous capital accumulation and labor supply 
  The paper has stressed the joint effects of leverage constraints and international portfolio 
integration in generating positive international co-movement in macro aggregates. The key 
mechanisms are based on interdependence in balance sheets and the magnification effects of 
asset price shocks in face of leverage constraints. The model lacks many of the standard features   49
of the international real business cycle (IRBC) literature, however. In particular, labor supply of 
both investors and savers is assumed to be inelastic, and there is no endogenous physical capital 
accumulation. A natural question to ask is whether the forces for positive macro co-movement 
outlined in the basic model extend to a full IRBC environment. In an interesting recent paper, 
Faia (2007) provides some relevant results. She explores the role of financial integration in 
DSGE framework where financial frictions in the manner of Bernanke et al. (2000) are present. 
Her results show that these financial frictions lead to a greater synchronization of international 
business cycles.  
Exploring the full implications of the leverage constraints and portfolio diversification 
channels for international business cycles is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, 
Devereux Sutherland and Yetman (2010) extend the basic model to a richer international 
business cycle environment, incorporating endogenous labor supply, reproducible capital 
accumulation and quadratic adjustment costs of investment, in conjunction with the channels of 
portfolio diversification and leverage constraints described above. Under this extension, the 
general features of the results described above continue to hold. In particular, the presence of 
leverage constraints generates an ‘international finance multiplier’ which tends to reverse the 
sign of the international macro-transmission of shocks. Nevertheless, a large number of questions 
remain unanswered – in particular pertaining to the role of financial shocks relative to real 
shocks, the comparison of different types of financial frictions and the role for financial 
intermediaries in the international propogation of shocks.  
In some ways investors in our model may be thought to parallel the banking system. In 
the model investors borrow money from savers and use this to invest in fixed assets, which might 
be thought of as similar to the way in which the banking system intermediates between deposits   50
and loans. Also, the downturn in our model, amplified by leverage constraints, might be seen as 
similar to the debt deflation and balance sheet deterioration within the banking system which 
operated during the financial crisis. However, the analogy to financial institutions is not perfect. 
For example, there is no maturity transformation in our model, which is a distinguishing feature 
of the banking system. In addition, whereas it is generally assumed that banks lend to 
entrepreneurs who then undertake investment projects, here the investors themselves take equity 
stakes in the capital projects.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has provided empirical evidence on the importance of balance sheet adjustments in 
propagating business cycle shocks across countries. Financial interdependence, combined with 
financial vulnerabilities, can open a channel for the transmission of shocks that may be as 
important as standard trade linkages. We have used this evidence to motivate a simple two-
country model in which highly levered financial institutions hold inter-connected portfolios, and 
may be limited in their investment activity by capital constraints. The combination of portfolio 
inter-dependence and capital constraints leads a negative shock in one country to precipitate an 
episode of global balance sheet contractions and disinvestment. In this sense our model may be 
seen as a formal general equilibrium representation of Krugman (2008) who suggests that inter-
connections in financial markets may give rise to an ‘international finance multiplier.’ In our 
model we find that, with high initial levels of leverage, the global effects of the shock may be 
substantially magnified. While the model illustrates the importance of financial connections, it 
abstracts away from trade inter-linkages. In a more elaborate model, it would be desirable to 
quantitatively investigate the relative importance of the two separate channels.  51
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